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REFORMING UNITED STATES SECURITY
ASSISTANCE
Duncan L. Clarke and Steven Woehrel*
INTRODUCTION
Beginning with President Harry S. Truman, every President of the
United States has deemed security assistance programs' to be impor-
tant means of promoting United States interests. Security assistance
has been used in support of a wide variety of policies, including the
Truman Doctrine and containment, the Vietnam War, underwriting
the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, and aid to the
newly democratic governments of Panama and Nicaragua. Since its
inception, a primary rationale behind the American security assistance
program has been to counter communism on a worldwide scale.3 The
program then expanded to meet additional United States foreign policy
* Duncan L. Clarke is Professor of International Relations and Coordinator of the
United States Foreign Policy Field at The American University's School of Interna-
tional Service. Clarke's most recent book is American Defense and Foreign Policy In-
stitutions: Toward A Sound Foundation (New York- Harper & Row, 1989). His next
book will examine security assistance.
Steven Woehrel is a policy analyst who received his M.A. in International Affairs in
1990 from the School of International Service, The American University.
1. There are numerous ways to define security assistance. In this article, the term
encompasses military assistance in the form of grants and some concessional low inter-
est loans to friendly countries for military equipment and training, and economic assis-
tance allocated via the Economic Support Fund for special political-strategic purposes.
See infra notes 15 to 24 and accompanying text (defining and discussing the Economic
Support Fund). The term excludes food aid and multilateral and bilateral economic
development assistance from its definition. Additionally, the definition excludes cash
arms sales, funds for peacekeeping operations, resistance groups, and international nar-
cotics control. This definition is narrower than that of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 where peacekeeping forces and cash arms sales are elements of security assis-
tance. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1988) (defining the term
security assistance).
2. See HOUSE Com.i. ON FOREIGN AFF., 101sr CONG., isT SEss., TASK FORCE ON
FOREIGN AISTANCE OF HOUSE Coms. ON FOREIGN APP. (Comm. Print 1989) [here-
inafter HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE] (statement of Larry Q. Nowels, Specialist in
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division) (providing a list of
high priority aid endeavors); Grimmett, Role of Security Assistance in Historical Per-
spective, in U.S. SECURITY ASSiSTANCE: THI POLITICAL PROCESS 1, 4, 21-26 (1978);
CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PRoaRmaS, FIscAL YEAR
1991, at 224-26 (1990); [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION, 1991] Bush
Signs Aid Package for Panama, Nicaragua, Wash. Post, May 27, 1990, at A4 [herein-
after Bush Signs Aid Package].
3. N. EBERSTADT, FOREIGN AID AND AMEIuCAN PURPOSE 21-32 (1988).
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objectives such as securing American interests in the Middle East, and
countering additional unfriendly political forces throughout the world.
The early Bush Administration, like previous administrations, adopted
most "traditional" arguments in support of the United States govern-
ment's use of security assistance such as: security assistance helps
friendly nations to defend themselves against external threats and in-
ternal instability; it strengthens economies of friendly nations and ad-
vances United States economic interests; it promotes regional security
and maintains the cohesion of United States alliances. The administra-
tion has also asserted that security assistance secures for the United
States access to overseas military bases and facilities, increases Wash-
ington's political influence with recipient states, and defends demo-
cratic values and institutions.
Many of these traditional objectives require reexamination. This is
particularly true because the primary justification for security assis-
tance in the past-thwarting the expansion of communism-is no
longer compelling. The Soviet Union is experiencing profound internal
turmoil, while, at the same time, its global military presence and politi-
cal influence recede. In its place, new political, economic, and security
systems are forming in Europe. In addition, the United States foreign
assistance program is beset by several long-standing problems that the
changing international system and competing claims on a fiscally con-
strained foreign aid budget make much harder to ignore.
As the aftermath of Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait will
surely illustrate, security assistance still has a substantial role to play in
world politics. There is, however, an ever-growing consensus that the
program must adapt to a new environment.5 Unfortunately, this is per-
haps the only area in which there is agreement. The question of how
security assistance should serve United States interests sparks consider-
able controversy in the legal and political communities. The security
assistance program has never been without controversy except during
the earliest years of the cold war when the threat of global communism
was most profoundly felt.6 This article examines key dimensions of the
security assistance program as it currently exists, reviews its historical
development, and addresses frequent criticisms. The article then makes
4. CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION, 1991, supra note 2, at 2-3; HFAC, HAMILTON
TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 24.
5. See Graves, Implications for the Future of Security Assistance as an Instru-
ment of Defense and Foreign Policy, in U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: THE POLITICAL





proposals for reform of the current system and suggests how the pro-
gram may evolve in the future.
I. DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
Since the mid-1980s, foreign assistance budgets have generally de-
clined in constant dollars, have favored "security assistance" over "de-
velopment assistance," and have targeted a small, select group of coun-
tries.7 The foreign assistance appropriation for fiscal year (FY) 1990
rose to $15.5 billion, almost $1 billion above the FY 1989 level, but
this was only because of a one-time supplemental aid package-most of
which went to Panama and Nicaragua. The total foreign assistance
budget for FY 1991 was $15.4 billion. In recent years, between fifty
and sixty percent of the total aid budget has been devoted to security
assistance. Eight strategically important countries received over one-
half of all United States foreign assistance in FY 1990: Israel, Egypt,
Pakistan, Turkey, the Philippines, El Salvador, Greece, and Panama.8
By FY 1991, Pakistan, El Salvador, and Panama were no longer
among the leading recipients of U.S. aid.9 Overall, the Middle East.
region has received more than fifty percent of United States aid since
the mid-1970s. For example, from FY 1977 to FY 1990, Israel and
Egypt together accounted for forty percent of all United States foreign
assistance.10
A. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
The two primary components of security assistance, military aid and
economic assistance for the Economic Support Fund (ESF), comprised
approximately thirty percent and twenty percent respectively of all for-
eign aid in FY 1991. These percentages in FY 1990 were, respectively,
thirty-six percent and twenty-six percent. Outright grants under the
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program accounted for more than
7. For a definition of "security assistance" see Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22
U.S.C. § 2151 (1988). Development assistance is designed to encourage long-term eco-
nomic development by creating programs that enable a host country to utilize its re-
sources more effectively. HFAC, HAuLTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 1. The
United States has bilateral development programs administered by the Agency for In-
ternational Development (AID) and provides mutilateral development assistance
through contributions to various multinational development banks and organizations.
Id.
8. Bush Signs Aid Package, supra note 2, at A4; HFAC, HAILTON TAK FORCE,
supra note 2, at 10-14; State Department Plans Sharp Cuts in Aid for Pakistan,
Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 1991, at A18 [hereinafter State Department Plans Sharp Cuts].
9. Id.
10. HFAC, HAmLTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 10-12.
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ninety percent of the entire military aid package ($4.66 billion in. FY
1991). 11 Between FY 1950 and FY 1991, Congress appropriated $73.4
billion in FMF grants and loans, of which Israel received $30.4 billion
and Egypt received $14.6 billion. 2 Since FY 1977, these two countries
have received sixty percent of all United States military assistance. In
recent years, the annual FMF allocation for Israel has been $1.8 bil-
lion, and $1.3 billion for Egypt. Of all nations receiving assistance in
FY 1990, five countries, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and Pakistan,
accounted for eighty-eight percent of the FMF program.' 3
B. EcONOMIC SUPPORT FUND (ESF)
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,11 the overarching legislation for
United States foreign assistance, requires the ESF to promote political
or economic stability in regions of special security interest to the
United States. 1 The State Department directs the ESF while the
Agency for International Development (AID) is responsible for its ad-
ministration.'" The ESF represents the single largest United States eco-
nomic assistance program. It totalled $3.14 billion for FY 1991. Dis-
bursements for FY 1991 were similar to disbursements in other years
since 1974 in that more than sixty percent of the 1991 ESF funds went
to Israel ($1.2 billion) and Egypt ($815 million). 17
11. Congress repeatedly denied administration requests to convert all military assis-
tance to grants, insisting instead on retaining a token level in concessional loans.
HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND
RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1991, H.R. REP. No. 553, 101ST CONG.,
2D SESS. (1990) [hereinafter FOREIGN OPERATIONS]; CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION,
1991, supra note 2, at 224-26.
12. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Doc. No. GAO/NSIAD-89-
78FS, SECURITY ASSISTANCE: UPDATE OF PROGRAMS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 10-11
(1988) [hereinafter GAO, SECURITY ASSISTANCE]; CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION,
1991, supra note 2, at 224-26. In 1990, Congress appropriated a minimum of $1.8
billion to Israel and $1.3 billion to Egypt. Foreign Operations, Export Financing and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1979,
1997.
13. GAO, SECURITY ASSISTANCE, supra note 12, at 10-16; CONGRESSIONAL PRES-
ENTATION, 1991, supra note 2, at 224-26.
14. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1988).
15. See AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND, HOUSE COMM. ON FOR-
EIGN AF., BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 101ST CONG., 1ST
SESS., at 261-63, 271-74 (1989) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF THE ESF] (statement of
Larry Q. Nowels) (providing an overview of the trends and patterns in ESF policy);
HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 261-74.
16. HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 262.
17. Id. at 20; GAO, SECURITY ASSISTANCE, supra note 12, at 35; Foreign Opera-
tions, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No.
101-513, 104 Stat. 1979, 1990. Since 1985 and the enactment of Public Law 99-83,
Israel has, unlike other ESF recipients, received this aid as a lump-sum payment within
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Presidents favor the ESF because it is a flexible account, unrestricted
by conditions that apply to other economic assistance programs. Al-
though more costly to the government, ESF permits the executive to
make relatively timely aid disbursements because a higher percentage
of ESF goes for budget outlays in the first fiscal year than does any
other component of the foreign aid budget. Furthermore, unlike other
aid accounts, ESF can be programmed in several ways to afford execu-
tive branch policymakers options in employing the money. 8 Approxi-
mately sixty percent of ESF is programmed for balance of payments
support in the form of cash transfers while the remainder is allocated
for development assistance and other purposes.19 Although the ESF is
economic, not military, assistance, it is classified as "security assis-
tance" in the president's budget and grouped with military aid.20 This
classification causes some confusion as to precisely what constitutes
ESF and development assistance within the foreign aid budget. Coup-
ling ESF with military aid makes security assistance the dominant fea-
ture of the total budget.2' Alternatively, if the ESF is included with
multilateral and bilateral development assistance, economic aid be-
comes the largest budget component.22 In this regard, some security
assistance advocates are concerned that placing ESF with military aid
makes ESF more vulnerable to budget cuts because military aid tends
to be less popular with Congress than development assistance.23 These
advocates also assert that because the ESF meets broadly defined de-
velopment needs, Congress should regard it as development aid.2'
These concerns are misplaced and the resulting debate is misleading.
The ESF has what an experienced congressional staffer calls "a con-
the first 30 days of the fiscal year. The funds are subsequently invested in United
States Treasury bonds until used. Annual interest paid on these deposits of early pay-
ments constitutes additional costs to the United States. For example, in FY 1989, this
amounted to $76.7 million. 136 CONG. REc. E578-79 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1990) (state-
ment of Rep. Lee Hamilton) (commenting on a letter from Assistant Secretary of State
for Legislative Affairs Janet Mullins).
18. Ryan, Foreign Assistance and Low-Intensity Conflict, in Low INrEsrrY CON-
Fucr: Tn PATTERN OF WARFARE IN THE MODERN WOR 166 (L.B. Thompson ed.
1989).
19. OVERVIEW OF THE ESF, supra note 15, at 273.
20. HFAC, HAimLTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 262.
21. In FY 1990, for example, ESF plus military aid comprised S9.7 billion of the
$15.5 billion foreign assistance budget. FORmEN OPERATIONS, supra note 11, at 4.
22. Id. In FY 1990, ESF, when added to the funds for multilateral and bilateral
development assistance, comprised $9.2 billion of the $15.5 billion foreign assistance
budget. Id.
23. Ryan, supra note 18, at 166.
24. Id. at 166-67.
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structive ambiguity" 28 that is generally acceptable to the majority of
Congress and the executive branch. While the ESF, which cannot be
used for military purposes, fits somewhat uncomfortably with military
aid, it is even less compatible with development aid. Congress allocates
only about one-third of ESF for development. This allocation goes to
countries where United States political-strategic interests, such as Mid-
dle Eastern and Central American peace, are priority objectives: Sound
development is a secondary objective.26 As Bush Administration AID
Administrator Alan Woods comments, "[s]trategic aid, sometimes in
the form of direct payment transfers, has little bearing on development
pure and simple."'27 From its inception, the ESF's primary purpos6 has
been to advance United States political and security objectives; long-
term development is always given a lower priority. Furthermore, the
administration explicitly uses a portion of the ESF as "political assis-
tance" or "walking around money". For example, when Vice President
Quayle visited Jamaica and Nicaragua in 1990, he took several million
dollars from the ESF to disperse locally. Indeed, virtually all United
States foreign aid, including military and most development and hu-
manitarian assistance, is designed to meet political-strategic objec-
tives. 28 This is why the State Department and the undersecretary of
state for security assistance, not the Department of Defense (DOD) or
AID, generally lead the interagency process for allocating ESF funds,
unless the White House intervenes.
There is little evidence that clustering ESF with military aid makes
it more or less vulnerable to congressional budget cuts. Although the
level of ESF aid may fluctuate over time, Congress is unlikely to im-
pose large-scale budget cuts for two reasons. First, many legislators be-
lieve that the president should have at least one relatively flexible tool
for dispersing aid. Second, select ESF recipients enjoy strong congres-
sional backing. If Congress is displeased with an aid program, that pro-
gram is in jeopardy whether it is labeled security or development
assistance.
25. Interview with congressional staff person in Washington, D.C. (May 1990).
26. Sewell & Contes, Foreign Aid and Gramm-Rudman, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 1021,
1027 (1987); W. QUANDT, Tim UNITED STATES AND EGYPT: AN ESSAY ON POLICY
FOR THE 1990S (1990).
27. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND THE NA-
TIONAL INTEREST: UNITED STATES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE INTO THE 21ST CENTURY
119 (1989) [hereinafter AID, DEVELOPMENT AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST].
28. Kramer, The Government's Approach to Security Assistance Decisions, in U.S.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE: THE POLITICAL PROCESS 101, 101-02 (1978).
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II. EVOLUTION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
A. LEGISLATION
As previously discussed, the United States security assistance pro-
gram sprang from a desire to contain Soviet expansionism. It evolved
from ad hoe aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 to a more systematic
approach with the implementation of the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949.29 This legislation created what was to become a central
element of United States foreign aid, the Military Assistance Program
(MAP), under which recipient nations received grants for military
equipment and training.30 A precursor to the current ESF, the Eco-
nomic Support for Defense fund was added by the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1951.31 The Mutual Security Act of 1954 established
the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit program, which is today the
FMF.32 In 1961, Congress consolidated these three programs (FMS
credit, MAP, and ESF) in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(FAA).3 3 Since it was enacted, the International Security Assistance
and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA) 3' has governed cash
and credit arms sales. The AECA is technically an amendment to the
FAA. The FAA remains the legal cornerstone for all United States
foreign aid, including security assistance.
B. LATE 1940s-EARLY 1970S
Between 1947 and 1952 more than eighty percent of all United
States foreign aid went to Europe.35 Marshall Plan economic aid
dwarfed security assistance, but the latter eased the economic strain on
Western Europe associated with defense buildup. By the 1950s, secur-
ity aid was shifted from a now more prosperous Western Europe to
East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.30 The same mix of
collective security alliances and security assistance that the United
States successfully employed in Europe was also initially applied to
29. Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-329, 63 Stat. 714.
30. See Grimmett, supra note 2, at 6-7 (providing a history of the Military Assis-
tance Program). The training program was separated from MAP in 1976 and named
the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). Id. at 7.
31. OVERVIEW OF rHm ESF, supra note 15, at 263-68.
32. Hildreth, Perceptions of U.S. Security Assistance" 1959-1983 The Public Rec-
ord, in U.S. SEcutrrY AssIsTANcE AND Tim PoLmcAL PRocEss 74 (1978).
33. Grimmett, supra note 2, at 7.
34. 22 U.S.C. § 2384 (Supp. III 1979).
35. L. Nowels & S. Heginbotham, An Overview of U.S. Aid Programs 16 (Con-
gressional Research Service 1988).
36. Id. at 2, 3.
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these other regions. This security aid was redirected in order to thwart
threats to friendly countries from the Soviet Union, Asian communist
nations, and insurgent groups, as well as to secure access to bases for
forward deployment of United States forces. The shift of assistance
from Europe to the Third World coincided with a decline in overall aid
levels, a trend that continues to the present day. 7 United States foreign
assistance declined from over two percent of the Gross National Prod-
uct (GNP) in the late 1940s, to one percent in the late 1950s, to less
than one-third of one percent in the early 1990s. 81 From the end of the
Korean War until 1964, military aid also declined, although defense
support assistance89-- mostly to Asian countries-increased throughout
the mid-1950s."
Western Europe had skilled workers and the sound political and eco-
nomic institutions necessary for recovery, 41 but as American security
interests and assistance expanded to Asia, Latin America, and Africa it
became clear that prescriptions successful in Europe were inapplicable
to the Third World. Some of these countries lacked the essential politi-
cal and economic base to effectively absorb security assistance. Except
for countries like Korea and Japan, it was often difficult to define the
threat or the interests to be protected. It was sometimes difficult to
determine whether threats to security were from Soviet or Chinese sup-
ported insurgencies, economic deprivation, a spectrum of internal politi-
cal, demographic, and cultural factors, or some combination of all of
these factors. Hence, by the late 1950s, both security assistance and
foreign aid shifted from a heavy military focus42 to development pro-
grams, that policymakers saw as antidotes to communism, and to
projects aimed at winning in-country support for sometimes shaky anti-
communist regimes. From 1956 to 1964, military assistance fell from
approximately forty-nine percent to approximately twenty-two percent
of the foreign aid budget.4'3 This change was particularly evident during
the Kennedy administration.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 19.
39. The program known as the ESF since 1978 previously had various names, in-
cluding "defense support", "supporting assistance", and "security supporting
assistance".
40. L. Nowels & S. Heginbotham, supra note 35, at 17.
41. See Grimmet, supra note 2, at 5 (emphasizing the Truman Administration's
commitment to supplying billions of dollars to Western Europe in order to facilitate
recovery after World War II).
42. See generally id. at 14-21 (providing an overview of the distribution of Security
Assistance from 1950 to 1963).
43. L. Nowels & S. Heginbotham, supra note 35, at 18; OvnRviEW OF THE ESF,
supra note 15, at 263-65.
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The Vietnam War dramatically altered the distribution of United
States security assistance. Congress established a special account called
the Military Assistance Service Fund" to fund the war effort. From
1964 to 1975 this fund received nearly twice the amount of the military
aid provided to the rest of the world combined. Additionally, more than
seventy-two percent of defense support funds went to Southeast Asia .4
More importantly, the Vietnam experience shattered the public and ex-
ecutive-legislative consensus that had supported American foreign pol-
icy and the security assistance program. By the late 1960s and early
1970s there was mounting criticism of security assistance. The notion
that the program was effective and necessary to build alliances for
fighting communism was no longer universally accepted. As a result,
Congress began to take a more assertive role in determining
allocations.
C. CONGRESSIONAL ASSERTIVENESS AND THE 1970s
A breakdown in the foreign policy consensus combined with other
factors such as the Watergate scandal, growing concerns about human
rights, regional arms races, and nuclear proliferation, contributed to a
pronounced congressional inclination to place restrictions on security
assistance.46 For instance, the AECA of 1976 gave Congress greater
control over cash and credit United States arms sales, and prohibited
arms transfers to countries engaging in "a consistent pattern" of
human rights violations. 47 Similarly, a provision of the AECA, often
called the Symington Amendment, forbids security assistance to coun-
tries contravening United States nuclear nonproliferation policies.' 8
Both restrictions, however, had provisions for presidential waivers. By
the mid-1970s, there was also a shift in emphasis within the military
aid program from grants to loans,4 9 and a notable deemphasis on secur-
44. Grimmett, supra note 2, at 23.
45. Id. at 20, 23; OVERVIEW OF THE ESF, supra note 15, at 266.
46. See G. WARBURG, CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS 45-47 (1989) (describing the
major changes in Congress during the 1970s).
47. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22
U.S.C. § 2384 (Supp. III 1979). See S. NEUmAN & E. HARKAvY, Amis TRANSFERs IN
THE MODERN WORLD 232 (1980) (criticizing the use of human rights standards as a
criteria for United States development assistance).
48. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22
U.S.C. § 2429 (1988). See R. BECKMAN, NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFE AION: CONGRESS
AND THE CONTROL OF PEACEFUL NuCL.AR Acnvins 242-44 (1985) (discussing the
legislative history of the Symington Amendment).
49. See P. HAziOND, D. LoUSCHER, M. SALoMoNE & N. GnIms, THE RELuc-
TANT SUPPLIER: U.S. DECISIONNIAKING FOR AMis SALES 125-67 (1983) (tracking the
direction of United States security assistance programs between 1950 and 1980); M.
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ity assistance generally. Not surprisingly, cash arms sales to Third
World countries escalated.50 This was consistent with the Nixon Doc-
trine of placing primary responsibility for defending United States al-
lies on the allies themselves.
51
Three additional points about the 1970s are noteworthy. First, the
Middle East (primarily Israel and Egypt) became, and remains today,
the dominant regional recipient of United States security assistance.
5 2
Second, strategic "base-rights countries" 53 such as Turkey, Greece,
Portugal, and the Philippines continued, as they do today, to receive
substantial security assistance. Finally, the Carter Administration
maintained the most restrictive postwar arms transfer policy ever
adopted by the United States,"s although the Camp David Accords and
Soviet activities in the Middle East, Africa, and Afghanistan prompted
some notable waivers of this policy. 55
D. THE REAGAN YEARS
The Reagan Administration made security assistance a cornerstone
in the global contest with the Soviet Union. In this regard, United
States policymakers perceived the Soviet Union as supporting wars of
national liberation and evincing "little or no interest in arms transfer
limitations."5 8 ESF assistance doubled from $3 billion to $6 billion be-
tween FY 1981 and FY 1985. Similarly, military assistance increased
from $4.6 billion to $6 billion during the same period (in constant 1989
dollars). 57 By 1984, military aid alone constituted over forty-two per-
cent of United States foreign aid.58 In contrast, development aid fell
KLARE, AMERICAN ARMS SUPERMARKET 13 (1984) (comparing sales of military equip-
ment and grants of military assistance).
50. M. KLARE, supra note 49, at 11.
51. Id. at 114-15.
52. See generally A. PIERRE, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF ARMS SALES 160, 166-70
(1982) (detailing the historical background of United States aid to Israel and Egypt).
53. Base-rights countries are those nations which have received significant amounts
of security assistance primarily because the United States wishes to secure access to
military installations on their territories. R. Grimmett, Current Issues with the 'Base-
Rights' Countries and their Implications 1 (Congressional Research Service 1988).
54. See id. at 52-54 (detailing the new restrictions on arms transfers introduced by
the Carter Administration).
55. See M. KLARE, supra note 49, at 45-46 (explaining the Carter Administration's
apparent inconsistency regarding arms transfers).
56. Buckley, Arms Transfer and the National Interest, 81 DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 51-
53 (1981).
57. See L. Nowels & S. Heginbotham, supra note 35, at 17 (1988) (delineating





steadily from just under forty-eight percent of United States foreign
aid between FY 1977 and FY 1980 to approximately thirty-eight per-
cent by 1985.19
Congress reacted to large federal budget deficits, passage of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction plan in 1985, and uneasi-
ness about President Reagan's tilt away from development aid, by cut-
ting security assistance during Reagan's second term.10 While security
assistance continued to dominate the foreign aid program, the ESF de-
creased from $6 billion to $3.3 billion and military aid declined from
$6.6 billion to $5.6 billion between FY 1985 and FY 1989 (in constant
1989 dollars). During the 1980s there was also a dramatic shift in mili-
tary aid from loans to grants."' In 1981, the ratio of loans to grants in
United States military aid was eighty percent to twenty percent; by
1988 that ratio was reversed. This shift was made to provide recipient
nations with better "quality" assistance considering declining United
States aid budgets, the large FMS debt burden of several countries in-
cluding Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, and the overall foreign
debt burden of many United States military aid recipients.02
III. CRITICS AND CRITICISMS
Foreign aid rarely enjoys broad-based, sustained public support. For
example, a 1988 survey found that fifty percent of the public believed
that "the United States foreign aid program is one of the best places to
cut federal government spending." 63 Public dissatisfaction with military
assistance programs is even more pronounced. The same survey re-
vealed that the majority of those polled favored economic development
and humanitarian assistance over military aid.6 Similarly, a 1986 Chi-
cago Council on Foreign Relations survey found that sixty-two percent
of those polled favored reducing military aid and only four percent
59. Id. at 18.
60. See G. WARBURG, supra note 46, at 233-38 (discussing the evolution of con-
gressional priorities, particularly during the Reagan years).
61. L. Nowels & S. Heginbotham, supra note 35, at 6.
62. L. Nowels, Foreign Aid: Budget Policy and Reform 3 (Congressional Research
Service 1989); interviews with executive branch officials (May-June 1990).
63. Martilla, American Public Opinion: Evolving Definition of National Security,
in AMERICA'S GLOBAL INTEREsTs: A NEw AGENDA 301 (1989).
64. Id. at 301-05. Sixty-one percent of those polled felt that economic development
best advanced United States interests, while 25 % thought military assistance was more
effective; 58% would decrease military assistance, 32% would keep it at the §ame
level, and seven percent would increase it. Id.
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would increase it.6 5 Development aid was somewhat less unpopular:
forty-eight percent would reduce it, eleven percent favored an in-
crease.6" In sharp contrast, a sample of the foreign policy leadership
expressed overwhelming support for both military and development aid.
Equally striking is the remarkable stability of both the public's and the
congressional leadership's attitudes on military and development aid
beginning in 1974 when the Chicago Council began its surveys. The
study concluded that public resistance to foreign aid is largely due to
persistent doubts about what aid actually achieves for the United
States or recipient countries.67 Another concern is that military aid will
draw the United States into a military conflict.68
Weak public support for security assistance, particularly the military
component, is accompanied by disagreement over the appropriate goals
of the program. Many still agree with most of the official, traditional
goals and rationales for security assistance.7 0 A growing number of leg-
islators and others, while accepting the need for security assistance, al-
beit at reduced levels, believe that the program must reflect United
States interests in an international system markedly different from the
cold war era.7 1 These critics are concerned that certain conventional
arms transfers exacerbate regional instability and increase the likeli-
hood of United States involvement in a conflict. They also fear security
assistance does little to serve the long-term economic interests of the
recipient. Lastly, critics express concern that the program gives Wash-
ington far less political leverage over recipient countries than is often
claimed, and that because virtually all security assistance is on a grant,
not loan, basis, it constitutes a net financial drain on an already fiscally
strained United States. 72
65. See J. RIELLY, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 26, 28
(1987) (discussing and analyzing public opinion surveys conducted by the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations from 1974 to 1986).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.; Hildreth, supra note 32, at 86.
69. See Mahoney & Wallace, The Domestic Constituencies of the Security Assis-
tance Program, in U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: THE POLITICAL PROCESS 125-41 (1978)
(detailing how the public and various interest groups evaluate economic and military
assistance programs).
70. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (listing historically cited rationales for
security assistance).
71. Mahoney & Wallace, supra note 69, at 130.
72. See ARMS CONTROL AND FOREIGN POLICY CAUCUS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS,
THE DEVELOPING WORLD: DANGER POINT FOR U.S. SECURITY (1989) (providing the
views of liberal and moderate legislators who share common concerns about interna-
tional affairs); A. PIERRE, supra note 52, at 165; Lewis, Political Influence: The Di-
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An additional group of critics is prominent in academic and nongov-
ernmental humanitarian and international development circles. It
would also include some liberal members of Congress. This group as-
serts, inter alia, that Congress should use foreign aid to alleviate pov-
erty and injustice in the developing world, with few or no political
strings attached, rather than to counter exaggerated or nonexistent
threats from the Soviet Union or other sources.73 Consistent with this
view, they argue that America's security assistance, and much of its
development assistance as well, perpetuates poverty, fosters or condones
undemocratic institutions and practices, and destabilizes the economies
of recipient nations to the benefit of large United States corporations.
74
With differences over goals as well as public antipathy toward for-
eign aid, it might appear that the security assistance program is skating
upon thin political ice. The situation in Congress, however, is even
more complex.
The absence of a broad-based constituency for foreign assistance
means that, except for the first eighteen months of the Marshall Plan
in Europe, and for specific countries at specific times, there is always
substantial congressional resistance to military and often economic
aid."5 In spite of this, most legislators vote for annual foreign assistance
appropriations even while denouncing foreign aid to their constituents
in Peoria or Providence. One reason for this seemingly inconsistent be-
havior is interest group activity. Most foreign assistance lobbyists focus
on a single country or program. The decline of the defense budget since
1985, however, prompted the defense industry to increase its lobbying
for all military aid programs. With the partial exception of Israel, this
is largely because the programs are tied to the purchase of United
minished Capacity, in AmsS TRANSFERS IN THE MODERN WORLD 184-99 (1980) (pro-
viding substantial criticism of current appropriations in the form of grants).
73. See Mahoney & Wallace, supra note 69, at 130 (explaining the tenets and
goals of post-cold war internationalists).
74. See LAPPE, SHURMAN & DANAHER, BETRAYING THE NATIONAL INTEREST
(1987) (providing virtually across-the-board criticism of the U.S. foreign aid program);
S. HoFFORD, U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1988); JOHAN-
smE, THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND Tim Hut, INTEREST (1980) (offering one aca-
demic's view of the adverse effects of this type of aid).
75. See HFAC, HAMLTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 257-59 (statement of
Thomas W. Galdi) (discussing the history of the controversy in Congress over foreign
aid); see also Obey & Lancaster, Funding Foreign Aid, 71 FOREIGN POL'VY 141, 146-
47 (1988) (emphasizing the lack of widespread support for foreign aid programs); L.
Mortsolf & L. Samelson, The Congress and U.S. Military Assistance, in MILITARY
ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY 147, 147-83 (C. Brandt ed. 1990) (explaining the
legislative process and congressional oversight concerning U.S. military assistance).
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States military equipment.7 6 More importantly, the Israel lobby,
spearheaded by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC), one of the most potent interest groups in the country, works
continually toward increasing the entire foreign assistance program.
AIPAC is disturbed when legislators support aid to Israel, but vote
against other major aid programs.7 This is significant as there is wide-
spread concurrence with the remark by one senior congressional source
that "there is a pervasive sense in Congress that a bill AIPAC is sup-
porting is not something we should vote against. '7 8 Some believe that
without the support of pro-Israel legislators and, to a lesser degree,
midwestern legislators backing the Food and Peace Program, a sub-
stantial portion of the entire foreign aid package could unravel.79
For various reasons, it is difficult to build and sustain a coalition in
Congress to pass a foreign aid measure. Although some in Congress
oppose all aid, liberal Democrats often favor development aid while
conservative Republicans traditionally favor security assistance.80
Moreover, many Republicans and Democrats support preferential
treatment for Israel and Egypt and oppose aid to countries that are not
formally at peace with Israel. Finally, legislators see a foreign aid bill
as an opportunity to make a personal imprint on foreign policy through
public statements and numerous amendments intended to satisfy con-
stituent interests. This is true even though some of these amendments
may be minimally related or unrelated to national needs.81
Despite a certain endemic unruliness in the process, historical battles
over foreign assistance have lessened considerably in recent years. Al-
though Congress often passes foreign assistance bills by substantial
margins, there will always be differences over the proper balance be-
tween development and military aid, and over uniquely controversial
76. See Mahoney & Wallace, supra note 69, at 143 (defining the American
League for Exports and Security Assistance). The American League for Exports and
Security Assistance, a coalition of companies and trade unions benefitting from United
States arms exports, has a long history of lobbying in Congress. Id.
77. Interviews with Republican and Democratic House and Senate Staff members
in Washington, D.C. (Apr.-May 1990). When, as in recent years, the foreign aid pie
shrinks, Israel's predominance in that budget stands out.
78. Interview with congressional staff person in Washington, D.C. (May 1990); see
J. Burke, U.S. Arms Sales to the Middle East: How and Why?, in MILITARY AssIs-
TANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY 129-30, 138 (C. Brandt ed. 1990) (assessing AIPAC's
influence on U.S. arms sales to the Middle East from 1975 to 1984).
79. G. WARBURG, supra note 46, at 236; M. FEUERWERGER, CONGRESS AND
ISRAEL 133 (1979).
80. G. WARBURG, supra note 46, at 237.
81. See id. at 234 (describing the process whereby foreign aid legislation frequently
becomes overburdened by nonessential restrictions); Obey & Lancaster, supra note 75,
at 148; Kramer, supra note 28, at 112.
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programs such as military aid to El Salvador. 82 The overall program,
however, is not adrift politically; there is still a consensus that security
and foreign assistance programs are necessary.
Compromise is most difficult in the area of military aid primarily
because this topic often triggers intensely held, yet clashing, values.
There is, however, solid support for the two principal recipients of mili-
tary and ESF aid-Israel and, primarily because of Israel, Egypt.
Moreover, two of the other major recipients enjoy formidable back-
ing-Turkey because of its strategic value, and Greece because of its
political influence with Congress. Some consensus will likely continue
to sustain even a significantly changed security assistance program.
Budget pressures, the aftermath of the Persian Gulf conflict, a dimin-
ished Soviet threat, and new goals for future security assistance will,
however, affect the equation. Many members of Congress are also con-
cerned about the adequacy of current foreign assistance legislation, the
management and coordination of the security assistance program, exec-
utive-legislative oversight of the program, and the degree of flexibility
that the president should have in employing security assistance as a
tool of United States foreign policy. These concerns have sparked some
interest in security assistance reform and closer congressional
monitoring.
IV. REFORMING SECURITY ASSISTANCE: PROPOSALS
Proposals to reform security assistance are nearly as old as the pro-
gram itself. Successive presidential commissions expended almost as
much effort trying to garner support from a skeptical Congress as they
spent in assessing specific programmatic shortcomings. Specifically, the
reports of Eisenhower's "Draper Committee""3 in 1959, Kennedy's
"Clay Committee"" in 1963, and Nixon's "Perkins Committee" 85 and
"Peterson Commission"' 86 in 1968 and 1970 respectively, advocated vig-
orous security assistance programs, adopted the traditional collective
security argument, and bemoaned the public's ignorance and lack of
enthusiasm for such aid. The reports' more substantive proposals
ranged from isolating military aid from other aid and locating it within
82. Military aid to El Salvador is controversial primarily because of human rights
abuses associated with elements of the country's armed forces. 136 CoNe. REc.
H12382-83 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Matthew McHugh).
83. G. HIDREm & E. GRAVES, U.S. SECURITY AssISTANCE: THE POLITiCAL PRO-
cass 45 (1985).
84. Id. at 54.
85. Id. at 64.
86. Id. at 65.
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DOD's budget as advocated by the Draper and Perkins Reports, to sep-
arating security from development aid while leaving the former with
the State Department as favored by the Peterson Report. 7
Two similar high-level reports appeared during the Reagan Adminis-
tration. The 1983 Commission on Security and Economic Assistance
(Carlucci Commission)"" drafted the first report. Secretary of State
George Schultz set up the Carlucci Commission for the express politi-
cal purpose of building public and congressional consensus for foreign
aid." Congress agreed with the Carlucci Commission's and administra-
tion's desire to increase the concessional component in military assis-
tance. Most of the other Carlucci Commission recommendations, how-
ever, were unremarkable and went largely unnoticed.90 In 1988,
President Reagan's Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy is-
sued a report that predictably favored more security assistance with
fewer congressional restrictions.91 One subgroup of the Commission,
headed by retired Army General Paul Gorman, offered more specific
observations and recommendations. These observations reiterated a
concern that the Pentagon had expressed since 1984. The thrust of this
concern was that the overall decline in aid levels, combined with
Israel's and Egypt's perennially dominant share of aid had caused a
sharp decrease in aid to smaller Third World recipients. Specifically,
this meant a seventy-nine percent reduction of aid to twenty-nine Third
World nations from FY 1984 to FY 1987.92 Several regional com-
manders in chief (CINCs) of United States forces and other senior
DOD personnel have long been displeased with Israel's "disproportion-
ate" share of aid.93
Recent private studies also address security assistance. Like the
Draper and Perkins Reports, some of the private reports urge the trans-
fer of military aid to the defense budget while others call for greater
87. Id. at 45-65.
88. THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, A REPORT TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE (1983).
89. G. HILDRETH & E. GRAVES, supra note 83, at 83.
90. Id. (citing COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND ECONOMIc ASSISTANCE, A REPORT
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE 3-5 (1983)).
91. COMMISSION ON INTEGRATED LONG-TERM STRATEGY, DISCRIMINATE DETER-
RENCE 17 (1988).
92. WORKING GROUP ON REGIONAL CONFLICT OF THE COMMISSION OF INTE-
GRATED LONG-TERM STRATEGY, U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM:
SECURITY ASSISTANCE AS A U.S. POLICY INSTRUMENT IN THE TIRD WORLD 16 [here-
inafter GORMAN REPORT] (1988).
93. Interview with former senior Department of Defense official (Mar. 1990). In
1987, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe employed the
same word in congressional testimony but substituted "Eastern Mediterranean" for
"Israel". GORMAN REPORT, supra note 92, at 13.
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differentiation between military and development aid within the State
Department."4 A Heritage Foundation report advises reductions in both
development and security assistance. 5 Still other reports continue to
recommend a shift away from security assistance and toward long-term
development aid.9
A. The Hamilton Task Force
Many factors prompted congressional interest, particularly in the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, in reforming foreign assistance leg-
islation in the late 1980s. 97 These factors included: (1) the reduced for-
eign aid budget; (2) the long-term prospect of low or no growth in this
budget; and (3) public dissatisfaction with the foreign assistance pro-
gram. The Foreign Affairs Committee expressed a widely held view
that the "foreign assistance program was not focused,... had failed to
achieve its intended purposes ... [and] was ... fragmented, uncoordi-
nated, and ineffective in advancing national objectives." 931 As a result,
the Hamilton Task Force, a bipartisan task force of Committee mem-
94. See INT'L. TRADE AND DEv. EDuc. FOUND., THE CONVERGENCE OF INTERDE-
PENDENCE AND SELF-INTEREST: REFORiS NEEDED IN U.S. ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES (1989) (recommending that military aid be the responsibility of the
Department of Defense).
95. Bergner, Security Assistance, in U.S. AID TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD: A
FREE MARKET AGENDA 89-101 (D. Bandow ed. 1985).
96. See R. SMUCKLER, R. BERG & D. GORDEN, NEw CHALLENGES, NEw OPPoR-
TUNITIES: U.S. COOPERATION FOR INTERNATIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN
THE 1990s (1988) (recommending broadly based economic growth, an effective attack
on poverty, and an end to the destruction of the environment); S. HELLINGER, D. HEL-
LINGER & F. O'REGAN, AID FOR JUST DEVELOPMENT 76 (1988) (recommending that
completely different agencies than those controlling development assistance administer
aid for political and security purposes). But see AID, DEVELOPMENT AND THE NA-
TIONAL INTEREST, supra note 27, at 24 (observing that there is confusion not only over
how well the development assistance program works, but also over what it intended to
accomplish).
97. HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 29.
98. HOUSE CoMI. ON FOREIGN AFF., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACT OF
1989, H.R. REP. No. 2655, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989) [hereinafter INTERNA-
TIONAL COOPERATION ACT]. The frequent inability of the House to pass annual for-
eign assistance authorization legislation diminished the Committee's standing to set
policy in this area. Interview with congressional sources in Washington, D.C. (May
1990). The House approved such legislation only twice between 1981 and 1989. Id.
What the Foreign Affairs Committee lost, the Appropriations Committee and its For-
eign Operations Subcommittee gained. Id. Therefore, the Foreign Affairs Committee
sought to recoup lost influence by writing legislation. Id. See L. Nowels, Foreign Assis-
tance: Congressional Initiatives to Reform U.S. Foreign Aid in 1989, at 13-17 (Con-
gressional Research Service 1990) [hereinafter Nowels,.Foreign Assistance] (describ-
ing the process that led to the Hamilton Task Force report).
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bers, issued a report in February 1989. 99 The Task Force recommended
the most sweeping overhaul of foreign assistance legislation since
1961.100 One of the report's more prominent themes, that won the low-
profile support of the Bush Administration, was the need for Congress
to resist the temptation to micromanage the program. 011 The report
stated that a maze of congressionally imposed conditions and restric-
tions had engendered such "confusion, ambiguity and bureaucratic
gridlock," 102 so as to make "the present system unworkable and in-
creasingly irrelevant."'103
B. EARMARKING AND CONDITIONALITY
Few issues in foreign policy are more controversial than the Congres-
sional practice of earmarking and conditioning foreign aid. Earmarking
refers to congressional actions in an authorization or appropriation act
whereby Congress sets aside or "earmarks" funds for a specific pro-
gram or account. Throughout most of the 1980s Congress earmarked
about ninety-two percent of military aid, between eighty and ninety-
eight percent of ESF, and fifty percent of development aid.10' Fiscal
Year 1991 saw a reduction in earmarking, but eighty percent of the
security assistance budget was still earmarked.10 5 "Conditionality," on
the other hand, refers to the numerous conditions, directives, and re-
strictions in foreign aid legislation and committee or conference reports
that must be followed by implementing agencies and recipients of
United States assistance. 10 8
Among both executive branch officials and (often privately and selec-
tively) many members of Congress, "earmarking" is a pejorative word.
There are several reasons for this. First, earmarking restricts the presi-
dent's flexibility to meet unforeseen contingencies that may arise over
the course of the fiscal year.10 7 For example, Bush Administration offi-
99. HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2. The task force was named after
its co-chairman, Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN). See Nowels, Foreign Assistance, supra
note 98, at 13 (discussing the Task Force).
100. Id. at 32.
101. See id. at 27-28 (noting that in the foreign assistance area, the executive
branch regularly complains that congress involves itself too deeply in programmatic
details, that is, it "micromanages").
102. Id. at 32.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 27.
105. L. Nowels & E. Collier, Foreign Policy Budget: Issues and Priorities for the
1990s, at 1 (Congressional Research Service 1991).
106. HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 27.
107. Id. at 32 (criticizing the effect of earmarking on the United States' ability to
meet the changing financial needs of aid recipients).
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cials indicated that earmarking hindered the expeditious shifting of as-
sistance priorities toward Eastern Europe and Central America in 1989
and 1990. Second, earmarking also limits United States leverage over
the policies and practices of politically favored recipient nations such as
Egypt and Israel, because those nations are accustomed to knowing in
advance that they will receive assistance, and the exact amount of the
assistance. Thus, the predictable annual deposit of no less than $3 bil-
lion in Israel's account arguably does little to induce the Israelis to be
more sensitive to Washington's interests in, for example, significant
movement toward an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.108 At the same
time, however, this lack of United States leverage is also an example of
why earmarking will not be eliminated.109 Many members of Congress
resist presidential manipulation of certain nations through security as-
sistance programs. Specifically, few members of Congress publicly wish
to create conditions that allow presidents to pressure Israel.
A third issue-as noted in the Gorman Report"n--is the frequent
mismatch between restrictive security assistance legislation and United
States military requirements. Although a valid consideration, a central
purpose of security assistance is to foster or maintain good political
relations, not simply to enhance United States defense posture. Conse-
quently, for their own domestic political reasons, many aid recipients
insist that security assistance be distanced from United States defense
plans. The Gorman Report also addressed the severe reduction of
small, unearmarked programs in times of budgetary stringency. To al-
leviate this situation, the Hamilton Task Force recommended establish-
ing a "regional contingency fund" to finance small programs for Third
World countries with specific military needs.""" This would require the
executive branch to notify Congress before using money from the
fund.112 The proposed fund was essentially an "unearmarked
earmark"" 3 designed to "out-earmark the earmarkers.' In sum,
Congress would set aside an unearmarked two percent of the foreign
assistance budget to give the president some flexibility to assist select
smaller recipients. The fund's modest size and the case-by-case report-
108. See id. at 39-40 (describing the restricting effect earmarking has on United
States policy leverage).
109. Id. at 40.
110. GoRtAN REPORT, supra note 92, at 42-45.
111. HFAC, HA1NULTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 40.
112. Id.
113. Confidential interview with former congressional staff member (May 1990).
114. Id.
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ing requirement, however, led the Bush Administration to reject this
recommendation. 115
In addition to the Regional Contingency Fund, the Hamilton Task
Force urged Congress to sharply reduce earmarks and conditions on
foreign aid.1 6 The Task Force optimistically believed that this would
improve legislative oversight because Congress could then concentrate
much needed attention on program results rather than on various
prohibitions, reporting requirements, and assorted conditions. This call
for earmark reductions, however laudable, was more an aspiration than
a realistic expectation. The Hamilton Task Force itself acknowledged
that "politically inevitable earmarks will go forward." 11
Because earmarked funds for Israel and Egypt constitute a large
part of United States foreign aid, and a huge share of security assis-
tance, any movement away from earmarking in the immediate future
will be modest and will not change these "politically inevitable" ac-
counts. In January 1990, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) called for
slight reductions in large earmarked accounts, including Israel's. A
combination of fiscal constraints, new aid commitments in Central
America and Eastern Europe, a declining Soviet threat in the Middle
East and elsewhere, and sharp aid reductions to thirty-five
unearmarked countries prompted this politically unusual request. In
1988, the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee's Foreign
Operations Subcommittee, Congressman David Obey (D-Wis.), raised
the possibility of a similar shift of aid away from major earmarked
recipients. Obey's idea went nowhere." 8 In this regard, the Bush Ad-
ministration backed Dole's proposal, on the condition that reductions
occur across the board. The measure died quickly, however, when sev-
enty-three senators wrote to President Bush and expressed opposition to
aid cuts to Israel and Egypt.1 19
115. Id.; HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 40; see also Ryan,
supra note 18, at 169 (listing specific examples of the reductions' effects on nations not
designated to receive funds).
116. HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 31-32, 39-40.
117. Id. at 31-32, 40.
118. Interview with congressional staff person in Washington, D.C. (May 1990).
This source reported that "[Secretary of State George] Schultz was unwilling at the
time to give unequivocal, open support and AIPAC blasted Obey. Only after Obey was
attacked did Schultz indicate some interest; by this time Obey was unresponsive." Id.
119. Dewar & Kamen, Cut in Aid to Israel Proposed, Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1990,
at Al; Kamen, Baker Favors "Shaving" U.S. Aid to Israel, Egypt, Wash. Post, Mar.




The Hamilton Task Force also examined the goals of security assist-
ance and aid to base-rights countries. Concerning the latter, the Task
Force considered budget constraints as well as the United States gov-
ernment's growing concern about the costly and unhealthy proclivity of
base-rights countries demanding ever-increasing levels of assistance as
the price for United States access to overseas bases. The Task Force
correctly noted that defense ties should be based on mutual security
interests, not on "rent" paid by the United States for the "privilege" of
using foreign military bases.1 20 As a result, it recommended that Con-
gress create a separate line item account with clear funding limits in
the military aid budget to fund existing commitments to Portugal,
Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines on a one-time, multi-year basis of
about five years.121 After that period, military assistance for bases
would cease.1 22 Portugal, Greece, and Turkey were also listed as near-
term candidates for "graduation" from military aid to cash sales (fol-
lowing the examples of Spain and Korea). 23
D. PROGRAM GOALS
In an effort to more precisely define security assistance goals, the
Hamilton Task Force also recommended replacing the AECA with new
legislation which would separate military aid, with its overriding politi-
cal linkages and objectives, from United States cash arms sales to
NATO and other allies.124 In addition, while acknowledging the politi-
cal purposes of military aid, the Task Force called for a clearer stand-
ard for evaluating the effectiveness of such assistance.'" 6 Specifically,
the Task Force recommended that the appropriate standard should be
the degree to which each assistance program advances United States
military objectives through, for example, joint defense research and de-
velopment undertakings and prepositioning of United States defense
material overseas.1 26 The Task Force further recommended that the
ESF be defined as supporting immediate political, economic, and secu-
120. HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 8.
121. Id. at 40.
122. Id.
123. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACT, supra note 98, at 4; HFAC, HAMILTON
TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 40-41; see generally R. Grimmett, supra note 53 (pro-
viding an overview of the Hamilton Task Force's recommendations).
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rity interests and be allocated to countries in a manner consistent with
the proposed definition.127
E. MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Finally, the Hamilton Task Force assessed the management and ac-
countability of foreign aid programs. It called for a much needed over-
haul of the five hundred page maze of often ambiguous, contradictory,
and even obsolete provisions that collectively comprise the Foreign As-
sistance Act.12 The Task Force urged a substantial congressional re-
duction in the two hundred eighty-eight annual foreign assistance indi-
vidual reporting requirements that cost AID alone 140 work-years to
fulfill.12 9 The Task Force also asked the president to correct long-stand-
ing defective executive branch coordinating processes. Problems cited
included foreign policy decisions that regularly ignore security and de-
velopment assistance implications, economic and military assistance
policies that are poorly integrated with one another, and military aid
programs that are inadequately coordinated with other strands of
United States policy toward recipient nations.130
The government's current foreign aid accountability systems are de-
fective. 131 They tend to focus on allocations of future assistance rather
than on the efficiency of past expenditures. 132 Consequently, DOD and
AID often ineffectively monitor improper practices by countries receiv-
ing United States aid. Moreover, congressional oversight of security as-
sistance is, in the words of a knowledgeable congressional staffer, "vir-
tually nonexistent." ' Realizing this practical reality, the Task Force
urged greater in-country monitoring of military aid and sales assets and
a genuinely centralized accounting system within DOD for military
sales. The Task Force also stressed the need for "more rigorous" con-
gressional oversight. 34
Some of the Executive's shortcomings are partly attributable to con-
gressional failure to enact statutory provisions specifically mandating
127. HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 31. Once allocated, how-
ever, ESF should foster the four basic objectives the Task Force set forth for all United
States economic aid: growth; environmental sustainability; poverty alleviation; and po-
litical, social, and economic pluralism. Id.
128. Id. at 29.
129. HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 27; AID, DEVELOPMENT
AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 27, at 114.
130. HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 28, 34-35, 42.
131. Id. at 27.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 27, 32.
134. HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 33, 39.
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post-delivery monitoring of grant military aid, and to congressionally
mandated, hard-to-monitor practices such as direct cash transfers to
recipient nations.1 35 Moreover, the limitations of congressional over-
sight are well known.138 For example, legislators rarely pursue a vigor-
ous oversight strategy without some political or personal incentive.
There are incentives for overseeing aid to such countries as El Salva-
dor, but there are few political rewards for scrutinizing aid to Israel.1
3
7
Problems in financial management and managing decentralized oper-
ations, staffing, and program budgeting impede AID's delivery of bilat-
eral economic assistance.1 38 Perhaps the most serious problem, how-
ever, is maintaining adequate accountability for direct cash transfers of
ESF aid. Most ESF takes this form, including all ESF to Israel.' 30 Al-
though Congress enacted legislation in 1987 requiring AID to maintain
special accounts to help track ESF expenditures, the General Account-
ing Office (GAO) found that foreign nations' actual use of these ac-
counts is impossible to verify completely.140 Consequently, these nations
have occasionally violated United States law when they use the ESF
funds."4' For instance, corrupt Central American officials may have de-
posited some of the aid in personal overseas bank accounts. 42 Respond-
135. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Doc. No. GAO/T-NSIAD-90-25,
AccouNTABiLITy AND CONTROL OVER FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 5-6, 14 (1960) (state-
ment of Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General) [hereinafter ACCOUNTA-
BiLrrY AND CONTROL] (discussing monitoring difficulties in direct cash transfers to re-
cipient nations).
136. See J. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRES-
SIONAL OVESIGHT 187-213 (1990) (presenting an overview of congressional oversight
practices).
137. See INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACT, supra note 98, at 121, 136 (stating
that assistance to El Salvador is linked to the promotion of a political settlement of
conflict, an end to human rights abuses, and respect for democracy and the rule of
law). The report also notes that Section 802 of the Act earmarks S1.8 billion for the
1990 and 1991 fiscal years in order to finance advance weapons systems for Israel. Id.
at 136.
138. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFiCE, DOC. No. GAO/NSIAD-89-61BR,
FOREIGN AID: PROBLEMS AND ISSUES AFFECTING ECONOMIc ASSISTANCE 2 (Dec.
1988) [hereinafter FOREIGN AID] (briefing report to the Honorable Lee H. Hamilton,
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs).
139. See Memorandum from Clyde R. Mark, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs,
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division (Mar. 8, 1988) (copy on file with the
author) (discussing United States laws that benefit Israel). In terms of cash transfers in
ESF assistance to Israel, no AID accounting is given as to how the money is used. Id.
140. AccoUNTABILrrY AND CONTROL, supra note 135, at 1, 20 (statement of
Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and Interna-
tional Affairs Division).
141. Id. at 6, 7.
142. See id. at 5-8; FOREIGN AID, supra note 138, at 18, 21-25 (discussing the
skimming of foreign aid into personal bank accounts); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, Doc. No. GAO/NSIAD-88-182, FOREIGN AID: IMPROVING THE IDPACT AND
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ing to these concerns, Congress enacted additional legislation in 1989
that required recipient nations to establish separate accounts for cash
transfer assistance in order to prevent the commingling of funds.143 In
November 1990, Congress created the Commission on Management of
the Agency for International Development Programs which was
charged, inter alia, with the task of making recommendations concern-
ing "the adequacy of systems of personal accountability for program
management.... "44
The delegation of accountability functions to the individual military
services creates additional problems in DOD. During the 1980s, El Sal-
vador, the Philippines, and some other nations engaged in "misexpendi-
tures" of United States military aid. The Justice Department is cur-
rently investigating additional cases.14 In addition, when the military
services and intelligence agencies detect a recipient country's illegal
transfers of United States defense material to a third party, the United
States rarely imposes sanctions.1 46 The State Department usually re-
sists sanctions because enforcement risks straining diplomatic relations
with the violating country, and because it is sometimes difficult to di-
rectly trace the illegal transfers to the government and, said a former
senior DOD official, it is politically "very hard to lay a finger on
Israel. ' 1 47 Finally, FMF cash sales pose the biggest problem. Hundreds
CONTROL OF ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4, 46 (1988)
[hereinafter CONTROL OF ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS]. A former senior Department
of Defense official remarked: "Senior AID and DOD officials don't care that much
about accountability. They'll deal with particular problems but the fact is that some
aid to Third World countries is going to be skimmed off. It's often a cultural thing. If
you don't understand this, you're an idiot. The issue is: how do you proceed despite
predictable, minor corruption." Interview with former Department of Defense official
in Washington, D.C. (May 1990).
143. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Act, 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-167, 103 Stat. 1195-1264 (1989).
144. Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1991, Pub. L. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1979, 2022-23.
145. See ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL, supra note 135, at 18-22 (statement of
Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and Interna-
tional Affairs Division) (focusing on grant aid accountability control over technology
transfers, accounting systems for military aid, and the difficulties encountered in audit-
ing covert aid).
146. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Doc. No. GAO/NSIAD-89-
186, EL SALVADOR: TRANSFERS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FUND (Report to the Honor-
able Tom Harkin, United States Senate) [hereinafter TRANSFERS OF MILITARY ASSIS-
TANCE FUND] (finding that in 1986 and 1988, the Salvadoran Air Force transferred
MAP-funded fuel to third parties without United States' consent).
147. See HFAC, HAMILTON TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 39 (referring to El Sal-
vador and Israel as examples of nations previously making illicit third party transfers
of United States defense material); TRANSFERS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FUND, supra
note 146, at 1-2; see also Clarke & Cohen, The United States, Israel and the Lavi
[VOL.. 6:217
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
of millions of dollars were reportedly unaccounted for due to deficient
Pentagon accounting procedures that both GAO and DOD auditors
had faulted for more than ten years.14 8 Congressional criticism
prompted the Pentagon to belatedly institute several improvements in
its central accounting system in early 1990.140
F. REFORM LEGISLATION FAILS
In June 1989, the House Foreign Affairs Committee accepted most
of the Task Force proposals, but the Committee rejected two crucial
recommendations: phasing out aid tied to base rightseo (even though
the Committee conceded this aid could not be sustained in the long-
term) and reductions in earmarking. The base-rights issue became
prominent by late 1990, particularly in the case of the Philippines.
Many members of Congress, however, remain unwilling to significantly
dilute the powerful check on the executive that earmarking provides. 1
In 1989, the House passed the first foreign aid authorization bill
since 1985. Unfortunately, the Committee's reform proposals were not
enacted into law because an authorization bill never reached the Senate
floor. 152 Due, however, to the persistent, formidable problems afflicting
foreign assistance, interest in reform remains alive in Congress, espe-
cially in the House.
V. THE FUTURE
A. CONSENSUS?
The Vietnam War weakened consensus behind the traditional goals
of security assistance, and support continued to wane after the war's
end. This trend was especially evident during President Reagan's sec-
ond term, when aid budgets fell dramatically25 3 Still, throughout the
Reagan years, Congress generally agreed that the Soviets, Third World
communism, and other forces were threats to be that needed countered.
Fighter, 40 MIDDLE E.J. 21-22 (1986) (discussing the strategic ramifications of the
Lavi fighter and Israeli transfer of United States technology).
148. See Acconri~muTY AND CONTROL, supra note 135, at 16-17 (reviewing the
accounting system that supports the transfer of United States military aid).
149. Id.; HFAC, HAmLTON TAsK FORCE, supra note 2, at 38-39.
150. See generally R. Grimmett, supra note 53 (focusing on central problems in
maintaining overseas military installations); INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AT,
supra note 98, at 4 (1989).
151. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACT, supra note 98, at 4, 174.
152. See Nowels, Foreign Assistance, supra note 98, at 24-25 (describing the Sen-
ate's inability to take action on the bill).
153. G. WARBURG, supra note 46, at 142-45.
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Moreover, congressional majorities regularly appropriated aid for Israel
and Egypt, for new democratic governments such as the Philippines,
for securing overseas base rights, and for more controversial assistance
to so-called front-line states like El Salvador, Honduras, and Pakistan.
While Congress grumbled about paying "rent" for foreign bases, it
made the payments. Moreover, aid to the front-line states continued
despite often intense criticism. For example, aid to El Salvador was
particularly generous considering the strained relationship between
Congress and the Reagan Administration over Central American
policy.
Today, support for some of the traditional objectives of security as-
sistance, although not for security assistance as such, is gone. A central
reason is the rapid diminution of a Soviet threat since 1989.154 CIA
Director William Webster testified in March 1990 that even if Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev was ousted, the successor regime "would
have little incentive to engage in major confrontations with the United
States" '155 and "would be unlikely to indulge in a major military
buildup." 156 Indeed, by September 1990, Presidents Bush and
Gorbachev had personally coordinated a Soviet-American policy to-
ward common goals in the Persian Gulf.
Meanwhile, as the Soviet Union suffers internal trauma, some re-
gional conflicts in Central America, Southwest Asia, and Southern Af-
rica have wound down or moderated. The United States also has new
nonmilitary aid priorities in Eastern Europe, Central America, and Af-
rica. Looming over future aid appropriations is a fiscal crunch that is
likely to constrain the size of the foreign assistance budget for several
years, if not longer. The absence or sharp reduction of a Soviet or com-
munist threat to most front-line and base-rights countries increases the
pressure to reduce some elements of the military aid budget. In the fall
of 1990, for example, Congress withheld fifty percent of the authorized
military aid to El Salvador because of that country's human rights
abuses, although President Bush moved to restore these funds in 1991.
Congress also halted all aid to Pakistan because of the U.S. govern-
ment's nuclear proliferation concerns, Pakistan's drift away from de-
154. See Soviets Plan to Review Military Aid, Wash. Post, May 27, 1990, at Al
(stating that Soviet military aid to the Third World dropped by $2 billion in 1989). In
May 1990, Moscow announced a "radical review" of its foreign military assistance
programs. Id.
155. HousE Comm. ON ARMED SERVICES, Tm FADING THREAT: SOVIET CONVEN-





mocracy, and drug trafficking in that country. While Turkey's key role
in the allied war effort against Iraq will preserve its portion-of security
assistance for now, the United States may eventually phase out its Phil-
ippine bases or, at the very least, reduce military aid to Manila.
157
While some military assistance programs will decline, the ESF
should remain intact. Israel and Egypt receive the lion's share of ESF.
Most of the 1989-1990 United States economic aid to Central America
and much of the aid to Eastern Europe was from the ESF. Despite
accountability programs and the shortcomings of its development assis-
tance component, the ESF does afford the president a rare measure of
congressionally tolerated flexibility.
Security assistance will not disappear. In fact, another consensus on
security assistance is already discernible. It is rooted in major part in
the status quo-fifty percent or more of all security assistance will con-
tinue to go to Israel and Egypt. Likewise, aid appropriations to most
base-rights and former front-line nations, while less secure, will proba-
bly continue for a time, albeit at reduced levels in several instances.
Beyond these customary purposes, however, there is strong support for
applying security assistance to new tasks such as countering illicit drug
trafficking in countries like Columbia and Bolivia; financing interna-
tional peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, Africa, and else-
where; and helping to establish a completely new, democratically
grounded political-security system in Europe. Although it is premature
to speculate on the form it might take, security assistance could very
well play a role in a future Persian Gulf-Middle East security system.
Finally, the effective end of the cold war will not necessarily lead to
a tranquil world order. Apart from Saddam Hussein's invasion of Ku-
wait and the resulting war, major conflict elsewhere in the Middle East
and in South Asia is possible. Chemical, biological, and nuclear weap-
ons, and sophisticated long-range delivery systems, pose formidable
threats to global stability. Moreover, what the Pentagon calls low-in-
157. Richburg, U.S. to Start Phasing out Military Bases in Philippines, Wash.
Post, Sept. 14, 1990, at Al. The House Appropriations Committee stated in June 1990
that it "expects to make substantial reductions over the next five years in military
assistance" to base-rights countries. HOUSE CoNS. ON APPROPRIATONS, REPORT ON
H.R. 5114, FOREIGN OPERATiONS, ExPoRT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAt, AP-
PROPRIATIONs, FIscAL YER 1991, H.R. REP. No. 553, 101 Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1990).
See also Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1979, 2009-12 (discussing military assis-
tance for El Salvador during FY 1991); State Department Plans Sharp Cuts, supra
note 8, at A18. See C. Brandt, U.S. Military Bases Overseas: Military Expediency and
Political Dilemmas, in 1MIuTARY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY 185-220 (C.
Brandt ed. 1990) (examining the past and likely future status of United States bases in
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines).
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tensity conflict, encompassing a spectrum of political-military opera-
tions in the Third World from counterterrorism to regional wars, is not
necessarily either a low cost or a low risk contingency. Current United
States policy, for which there is considerable congressional backing,
emphasizes indirect measures for dealing with many of .these contin-
gencies. This means, in no small measure, security assistance. 15 8
B. PRIVILEGED RECIPIENTS
Regardless of the level of resources devoted to security assistance,
program changes are necessary in order for the United States to effec-
tively interact with a rapidly evolving international system. Arguably,
this means breaking down the concentrated, rigid country allocation of
aid by reducing earmarking. This would give the president more flexi-
bility to respond quickly to changing circumstances, would allow for
more leverage with foreign aid recipients, and would possibly facilitate
the executive's redistribution of aid to nations deemed neediest (in
terms of United States interests).
A fundamental loosening of habitual aid allocation patterns is, how-
ever, unlikely in the near future. Congress will not give up earmarking
because many members regard it as an institutional prerogative and a
valuable check on the executive. Presidents themselves sometimes re-
quest special earmarks from Congress, such as when President Bush
asked Senator Daniel Inouye (D-Haw.) and others for earmarked funds
for Jordan in the 1989 defense bill.159 Moreover, there are some justifi-
able political (if not always national interest) reasons for the aid distri-
bution patterns in the cases of Israel and Egypt and the seven-to-ten
aid ratio for Greece and Turkey.160 Congressional activism concerning
security assistance may make the policy process messy and inefficient,
158. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Doc. No. GAO/PEMD-90-13, U.S.
WEAPONS: THE LOW-INTENSITY THREAT Is NOT NECESSARILY A Low-TECHNOLOGY
THREAT 1-9 (1990).
159. Interview in Washington, D.C. (May 1990).
160. The seven-to-ten ratio is grounded in two political considerations. First, the
Greek Government argues that this helps maintain a military balance vis-a-vis Turkey.
Second, while the executive has long viewed Turkey as more valuable strategically to
the United States than Greece, this ratio is responsive to a vocal "Greek lobby" in
Congress. Kramer, supra note 28, at 114-15 (1978). R. Grimmett, supra note 53, at
16. Interviews with executive branch officials and congressional staff members in
Washington, D.C. (Apr.-May 1990). It may be noteworthy, however, that the July
1990 agreement that renewed U.S. base-rights in Greece did not mention this ratio.
See C. Brandt, American Security Assistance in the 1990s, at 3-5 (Nov. 8-10, 1990)
(paper prepared for the International Security Section of the International Studies As-
sociation, Columbus, Ohio) (discussing the future of the United States security assis-
tance program in the decade of the 1990s).
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but legislators have their own priorities and program efficiency is not
always among them.
This implies that a huge share of United States security assistance
and foreign aid programs will continue to go to Israel and Egypt. 101
The protracted budget process during the fall of 1990 was simply one
indicator that the overall foreign assistance budget is unlikely to in-
crease significantly. Foreign Assistance funds for competing, worthy
purposes must come from a foreign aid budget that is effectively frozen
or, possibly, from DOD's budget. Washington's ability to adjust to a
changing world is thereby restricted. This is particularly unfortunate
considering the political uncertainty following the 1990-91 Persian
Gulf crisis. It is conceivable, however, that some members of Congress
may seek to scrutinize Israel's customary privileged standing when
Washington's attention returns to Arab-Israeli tensions.
C. REASSESSMENT OF AID TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT
Along with some other members in Congress, Congressman Obey
questions the appropriateness of generously financing an Israel that
does not make "active efforts at resolving regional problems."102 Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's disinterest in making even minimal
concessions toward settling the Palestinian issue was one major reason
why Thomas Foley (D-Wash.), Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives, ardent pro-Israel Congressman Mel Levine (D-Cal.), and others
warned in the spring of 1990 of increasing, yet private, congressional
criticism of Israel.263 A frustrated Secretary of State James Baker
emerged relatively unscathed after openly challenging Shamir in con-
gressional testimony in June 1990. Secretary Baker declared: "When
you're serious about peace, call us."1  Even as he announced suspen-
sion of peace talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
President Bush questioned the Shamir government's commitment to
peace. 165 The PLO's declared support of Saddam Hussein in August
1990 and Iraqi missile attacks on Israel in January and February of
1991 deflected this mounting chorus of United States criticism. The
161. See generally Mark, U.S. Laws That Benefit Israel (Congressional Research
Service 1988) (summarizing the numerous, often unique privileges accorded Israel). A
majority of Congress treat aid to Israel as a virtual entitlement. Interviews with con-
gressional staff people in Washington, D.C. (Mar.-June, 1990).
162. Obey & Lancaster, supra note 75, at 151-52.
163. Cohler, Don't Misread the Numbers, Wash. Jewish Week, May 10, 1990, at
7; Israel Faces Trouble in Congress, Wash. Jewish Week, May 31, 1990, at 2.
164. Goshko, Baker Says Israel Must Compromise, Wash. Post, June 14, 1990, at
Al.
165. Devay, President Suspends PLO Talks, Wash. Post, June 14, 1990, at Al.
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sincerity of Israel's interest in a balanced peace settlement, however, is
an issue that will surely recur.
In 1983, the United States signed formal strategic cooperation agree-
ments with Israel. President Reagan said that these agreements were
designed to counter "the threat to our national interest posed by in-
creased Soviet involvement in the Middle East."1 6 Today, in the post-
cold war era, the Soviet Union has sharply reduced its commitment to
Syria and has retreated from other states in the region.267 Conse-
quently, one cornerstone of the assertion that "Israel is a strategic as-
set" is either gone or rapidly crumbling. Of course, Israel's security
remains threatened. This is largely due, however, to the interaction of
Israel's own policies and practices and those of its neighbors, not the
Soviet Union. In the crisis with Iraq, Israel appeared to be a strategic
liability for the United States. Shortly after the invasion of Kuwait, for
example, United States government officials informed Israel that the
United States would not welcome overt Israeli involvement in the Gulf
Crisis.' 68 After war broke out in January 1991; the United States be-
came acutely concerned that Israeli military intervention could under-
mine the multinational coalition arrayed against Iraq.169
Secretary Baker correctly stated that United States foreign policy
"must reflect democratic values" 170 and that "the American people will
not support for long a policy that violates their sense of humane values.
•..,, Israel's democratic system is endangered and its image is tar-
nished because of its harsh treatment of Palestinians, especially during
the intifada. Similarly, most mainline Protestant denominations, the
National Council of Catholic Bishops, and the Holy See denounced
Israel's human rights record in the occupied territories and called for
166. White House Press Release, Nov. 29, 1983. See, EIZENSTAT, FORMALIZING
THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: THE NEXT STEP IN U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS (1988) (ar-
guing that a strategic relationship with Israel serves the interests of the United States).
167. Blitzer, New Era Soviet-U.S. Relations Could Impact on Israel, Wash. Jew-
ish Week, Jan. 4, 1990, at 15; Amouyal, U.S., Israel to Refine Military Relationships,
Defense News, Mar. 26, 1990, at 4; Cody, U.S.-Syrian Ties Warm a Bit, Wash. Post,
Sept. 16, 1990, at A25.
168. Confidential interview with executive branch official in Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 1990); see also Diehl, Cold War's End, Gulf Crisis Shake Israel's Security
Strategy, Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1990, at A25.
169. J. Diehl, Israel Agrees to Put Off Attacking Iraq, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 1991,
at A30.
170. Address by Secretary James Baker, "Democracy and American Diplomacy,"





Palestinian self-determination-" 2 Additionally, a 1989 Washington
Post-ABC News poll found that eighty percent of those polled believed
that Israeli human rights violations would weaken the backing for
Israel in the United States.1 73 That same poll found that initial senti-
ment favoring substantial aid to Israel decreased sharply once people
were specifically informed that Israel received $3 billion annually.17 ' A
1990 Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll found that Senator Dole's
proposal to trim aid to the largest recipients was favored by a sixty-
three percent to twenty-four percent margin, and that the public con-
siders Japan "to be more of a friend to the United States than
Israel."' 75 If the public knew that Israel annually receives substantially
greater benefits than the commonly cited figure of $3 billion, polling
results could change significantly. For example, in FY 1989 and FY
1990 Congress supplemented the officially reported $3 billion amount
(ESF plus FMF) with special perquisites and other aid for a total of
$3.742 billion in FY 1989 and $3.666 billion in FY 1990.170 Americans
would also not be pleased with Israeli surveys indicating that more Is-
raelis desire a government with "strong leadership" than one that is
democratic, and that seventy percent of Israel's Jewish population fa-
vors denying electoral rights to Israelis who advocate the establishment
of a Palestinian state.7 Although factors such as the PLO's identifica-
tion with Iraq in the Persian Gulf war might temporarily influence
172. Hamilton, American Churches Are Speaking out on Palestine and Israel,
WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFF., Jan. 1990, at 8, 16; MIDDLE EAST ASSocIATES,
STATEMENTS AND POSITION PAPERS OF MAJOR AMEIUcAN ORGANIZATIONS ON MID-
DLE EAST PEACE (R. Madrid ed. 1986).
173. Morin, Americans Polled Urge Israeli-PLO Talks, Wash. Post, Apr. 4, 1989,
at A17. See also Greene, Israel Faces Tough Days Ahead, Wash. Jewish Week, Feb.
9, 1989, at 6 (indicating that 51% thought aid should remain at current levels, 43%
favored decreasing it, and four percent supported an increase).
174. Id.
175. Dole's Plan, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1990, at 1.
176. Blitzer, AIPAC Pleased With Extra Aid for Israel Wash. Jewish Week, Dec.
21, 1989, at 7; 136 CONG. REc. E578-79 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Lee Hamilton); The actual subsidy to Israel in FY 1991 should far exceed S4 billion,
partly because Congress required $700 million in "excess defense articles" transferred
to Israel, it added $100 million to the U.S. military equipment stockpile in Israel, and
Congress provided for early distribution of the $1.8 billion FMF funds to Israel to be
invested in U.S. Government securities with the proceeds of the investment to be paid
to Israel. Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1979, 2063. In January 1991, the Israeli
foreign minister indicated that Israel had an immediate need for S13 billion! W. Clai-
borne, Israel Seeks $13 Billion More in Aid, Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 1991, at Al.
177. Israelis Want "Strong Leadership", Wash. Jewish Week, Feb. 1, 1990, at 10;
Right-wing Attitudes in Israel, Wash. Jewish Week, June 14, 1990, at 2.
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United States public opinion, Israel faces a major problem in this
regard.
The reality that Egypt would not have received $28 billion in United
States aid between 1980 and 1991 without the backing of a U.S. pro-
Israel constituency, 17 8 and views, such as Congressman Hamilton's that
the United States spends billions of dollars on Egypt and "we get noth-
ing in return"1179 create additional problems. Aid allocations to Israel
and Egypt, however, remain untouched. Indeed, Egypt's position was
strengthened substantially when, at his request, Congress authorized
President Bush to forgive $6.7 billion of Egypt's debt to the United
States in recognition of Cairo's strategically important role in the col-
lective opposition to Iraqi aggression.1 80
Concerning Israel, one of several potential indicators of future
change is found within the American Jewish Community itself. Steven
M. Cohen's often cited surveys show that while American Jewish lead-
ers strongly favor aid to Israel, sixty-three percent fear that the in-
tifada could affect Israel's democratic character and sixty percent think
Israel is mistreating Arabs in the occupied territories. While Israel re-
tains a central place in the Jewish consciousness, many events since
1982, such as the intifada, the deep cleavages within Israel's society
and government, the Jonathan Pollard espionage affair, and the war in
Lebanon suggest a possible distancing of many American Jews, espe-
cially the young, from Israel.18' If so, politicians may gradually acquire
more flexibility to deal with this sensitive issue.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of dramatic upheavals in the international system after
1989, there were some notable redistributions of security assistance and
other United States foreign aid. Congress slashed aid to such former
front-line, anti-communist states as El Salvador and Pakistan in the
FY 1991 budget, and aid reallocations will continue to occur. For ex-
ample, development assistance, particularly to Africa, will receive
178. W. QUANDT, supra note 26, at 5, 9-10.
179. Ottaway, U.S. Withholds $230 Million from Egypt, Wash. Post, Mar. 8,
1989, at A26.
180. Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1979, 2059-60; Atherton, Recognizing the
Role of Egypt, Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1990, at A4.
181. COHEN, ISRAEL-DIASPORA RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWISH
LEADERS 9, 11-12, 29-31, 67-69 (1989) (published by the Israel-Diaspora Institute, Tel
Aviv, Israel); COHEN, TIES AND TENSIONS: AN UPDATE-THE 1989 SURVEY OF AMERI-
CAN JEWISH ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAEL AND ISRAELIS (1989).
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greater attention, and certain base-rights countries, like the Philippines,
face probable future cuts in military assistance.
Because Israel and Egypt so dominate the U.S. security assistance
program, fundamental shifts in aid allocations have not yet occurred.
This situation could change for reasons discussed above, although al-
most certainly not in the immediate future. The continued centrality of
U.S. subsidies to Israel and Egypt, taken together with the near cer-
tainty of a constant or declining foreign assistance budget, means that
the U.S. government has little flexibility and relatively meager funds to
meet new global challenges. These challenges include assisting emerg-
ing democracies in Eastern Europe and perhaps even the Soviet Union,
dealing with regional and low-intensity conflicts, and countering terror-
ism and the international flow of illegal drugs. Consequently, most se-
curity assistance reforms in the foreseeable future 'ill likely be modest
and substantially within the present system.
Several recommendations of the Hamilton Task Force were impor-
tant and merited a more serious reception than they received in 1989.
To be sure, in 1990, some of the Task Force's prescriptions-such as
selectively phasing out aid for overseas base rights and tightening pro-
gram accountability-received considerable attention. Even so, the re-
form measures that are likely to be taken can do little to affect a pau-
city of resources and public support, nor can they rationalize a program
so enmeshed in and substantially driven by powerful political forces.
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